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The year 2020-21 has shown us that the likelihood of 
extreme events is greater than we would have expected.  
When organizational resources are stretched to their 
limits due to extreme events, they are also more 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks and knowledge risks. 
Based on the events that took place during the 2020-21 
period, we identify five knowledge risks and categorize 
them as technical, behavioral, and legal risks. We 
identify possible controls to mitigate these knowledge 
risks: proper knowledge identification, guidelines for 
employee knowledge behavior, identification and 
evaluation of online communication channels, and risk 
re-assessment to knowledge.  
1. Introduction  
2020 was a year of upheaval and unrest that is still 
impacting us in 2021 [10]. COVID-19 swept the world 
and shut down many countries across the globe. In 
addition to COVID-19, the United States had 
experienced a wide variety of difficulties, such as 
widespread civil strife with rioting in many cities 
beginning in the spring of 2020; multiple natural 
disasters such as several large wildfires in California 
and a severe hurricane season that affected the 
southeast United States and a record polar freeze that 
knocked out the Texas power grid during record 
freezing temperatures in the winter of 2021, a 
controversial presidential election, multiple cyber 
attacks that affected hospitals, financial systems, and 
production systems in food process and gas pipeline 
transport; widespread misinformation campaigns about 
the election and the COVID-19 vaccine [27].  
To combat COVID-19 the United States and much 
of Europe and Asia shut down most of its business 
operations.  The issue of communication and how to 
conduct work and everyday life came at the center of 
attention. Social media (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, 
etc.) and collaboration systems (Zoom, Teams) enabled 
communications between large numbers of people with 
little content moderation that resulted in the spread of 
misinformation and the increase of cyber-attacks via 
phishing and social engineering, and traditional 
communication.  
An additional impact of the shutdown was the loss 
and/or transience of employees.  Many businesses had 
to lay off employees when they couldn’t continue 
operations.  This situation caused a loss of knowledge 
flow from departed employees.  and loss off 
knowledge sharing among remaining employees. As 
operations are resuming businesses are suffering from 
not being able to entice former employees to return or 
to hire new, experienced employees. 
During the lockdown, organizations and 
businesses used knowledge systems (defined later) to 
manage the storage, retrieval, and application of 
business knowledge that had to be remotely accessed 
by employees.  A major task that businesses needed to 
prepare for was to defend their knowledge systems (to 
some degree) from cyber threats using best practices 
and risk assessment such as: 
• Protect their boundaries, repositories, and 
equipment. 
• Monitor for and respond to attacks and intrusions. 
• Monitor and guard against phishing and other 
social engineering attacks. 
• Be prepared for disaster response/business 
continuity. 
Organizations and businesses also reduced risk to their 
knowledge systems by monitoring and guiding remote 
users in how to connect, what systems can be used, 
online behavior rules, and even how to configure the 
employees’ home computers.  However, businesses 
were not prepared for the large-scale remote access and 
remote system use experienced in the last year. 
While there were many traditional security issues 
that businesses faced during the shutdown, this paper is 
not about those issues.  Our analysis focuses on threats 
we haven’t thought so much about when the shutdown 
started. However, these threats are now better 
understood and must be mitigated [27]. We list these 
threats here: 





• Impact of misinformation (primarily on decision 
making) 
• Impact of disinformation (primarily on decision 
making) 
• Impact of social media (primarily on disclosure 
and knowledge transfer and organizational impact 
but not the traditional threats from social media)  
• Impact of social isolation (primarily on decision 
making and knowledge transfer) 
• Impact of social justice movement (primarily on 
knowledge transfer through organizational culture) 
Research have discussed generic set of knowledge 
risks [16], however we do not yet understand the how 
the risks listed above affect knowledge. Thus, this 
paper discusses knowledge systems and their risks 
based on published surveys and reports that focus on 
the issues observed during the COVID-19 pandemic.   
2. Background  
2.1 The year 2020 
The year 2020 has been a difficult year for every 
country because of the global pandemic caused by 
COVID-19. As of May 30, 2021, the United States 
Center for Disease Control reports that the United 
States has had 33,079,543 cases of COVID-19 with 
591,265 reported deaths as of May 30, 2021 [34].  
Worldwide, Wikipedia (based on Johns Hopkins data) 
reports there have been 170,353,921 cases of Covid-19 
with 3,541,795 deaths [39]. 
Businesses ceased having workers come to the 
office, schools quit holding in-person classes, 
restaurants/gyms/clubs/ beaches/parks anywhere 
people gathered or interacted were shut down, and 
hospitals and medical facilities quit treating anything 
but COVID and emergency cases.  To survive, 
businesses, organizations, and schools as quickly as 
possible went online with some of the following 
outcomes: 
• Workers and students spent extended time 
working remotely outside of the business, 
organization, or school networks [17]. 
• Businesses, organizations, and schools moved 
business processes online. 
• Payment systems went touchless/contactless. 
• Tools such as Zoom, and Teams were quickly 
adapted and put into use [17]. 
• Travel and supply chains were disrupted  
• Social systems/networks such as Facebook, 
YouTube, Instagram, and Tik Tok became the 
primary means of social interaction and sources of 
information. 
• Most face-to-face communication outside of 
immediate family units ceased. 
Remote work caused employees to communicate 
with others whom they didn’t know in a virtual 
environment that significantly reduced body language 
feedback and influence by organizational/corporate 
behavior rules with the following outcomes:  
• COVID-19, social, and election misinformation 
and disinformation were/are rampant. 
• Social justice/change and upheaval have caused 
great uneasiness in organizations and with and 
between employees with many being afraid to 
express thoughts or opinions for fear of being 
“canceled.” 
• Social engineering/phishing attempts have become 
the prevalent cyber-attack vector [6]. 
However, the year 2020 and early 2021 presented 
organizations and companies not only with remote 
work issues but also increased cybersecurity attacks 
and threats. Before we start our analysis of the 
knowledge systems, we will define all the terms for 
more clarity of the explanations provided.  
2.2 Definitions of terms used 
Misinformation - is false, inaccurate, or 
misleading information that is communicated 
regardless of an intention to deceive. [40].  Managing 
the spread of misinformation has become a contentious 
issue due to who decides what is misinformation, what 
is an opinion, and what is truth. 
Disinformation - false information, which is 
intended to mislead, especially propaganda issued by a 
government organization to a rival power or the media 
[41].  Disinformation is a subset of misinformation 
with the key difference being the intent to deceive.  
Knowledge - Evolving mix of framed experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that 
provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating 
new experience into corporate decision making [7]. 
Knowledge is what is used to support decision-makers.   
Knowledge Transfer - refers to the sharing or 
disseminating of knowledge by a knowledge creator 
[1]. Knowledge transfer is important in knowledge 
systems and relies on trusted creators of knowledge 
moving that knowledge to repositories where it can be 
retrieved and used by knowledge users. 
Knowledge System/Knowledge-Based System - 
a system that captures and uses knowledge from a 
variety of sources to assist users with solving 
problems, particularly complex issues, using tools such 
as AI, Big Data, DSS, knowledge retrieval, etc. These 
systems are primarily used to support human decision-
making, learning, and other activities [22]. This paper 
uses the term Knowledge Systems interchangeably 
with Knowledge-Based Systems.   
Page 5590
Risk - the net negative impact of the exercise of a 
vulnerability considering both the probability and the 
impact of occurrence [23]. The impact of occurrence 
can be more broadly considered a hazard, an 
uncertainty, or an opportunity [5]. Viewing risk as 
something more than a hazard is highly applicable to 
knowledge systems [15]. Although KM risks can lead 
to negative results, they can also represent significant 
opportunities for learning or new knowledge 
applications. Uncertainties connected to knowledge 
systems can be a threat to efficiency, but also an 
opportunity for innovations [16]. In this paper we 
examine the events from 2020-21 in light of this broad 
understanding of risk as not only threats, but also as 
uncertainties and opportunities.  
2.3 Knowledge system risk assessment 
Assessing cybersecurity in the organization starts 
with risk assessment. Jennex and Durcikova [16] 
discuss risk and threat assessment specific to 
knowledge systems and build the theoretical 
foundation for knowledge system threat assessment.  In 
this paper we apply this foundation in analyzing the 
events of the recent year 2020-21. 
The knowledge system risks are assessed by using 
the KSRM approach of Ilvonen et al. [12] for 
knowledge security risk management. Ilvonen et al.  
[12, p.13] define knowledge security “as the 
managerial process of organizations to identify threats 
toward important knowledge and secure the knowledge 
against those threats.”  
The point of interest in this definition is important 
knowledge: knowledge that is important to the 
organization needs to be identified in all the forms and 
locations that it resides in, for the organization to be 
able to do any risk management measures with it. The 
knowledge risk assessment process thus begins with 
the identification of knowledge assets by recognizing 
not only the documented knowledge within different 
systems of the organization, but also the ways of 
knowledge sharing and transfer and the role of people 
and tacit knowledge within the knowledge system. 
 Jennex and Durcikova [16] present a set of 
knowledge system specific generic threats. The six 
generic threats are: 
 Failure to identify and capture critical knowledge 
in the knowledge creation process. 
 Not having knowledge creation, capture, and use 
aligned with organizational strategy.   
 Disclosing critical knowledge to unauthorized 
recipients in the knowledge sharing processes.   
 Losing critical knowledge by not capturing it from 
critical human sources. 
 Losing critical knowledge by not storing it on 
nonvolatile media or by not migrating knowledge 
with changing storage standards or by not meeting 
legal standards for storing critical knowledge. 
 Giving bad advice by not using appropriate 
knowledge or by using inappropriate knowledge. 
Jennex and Durcikova [16] provided an in-depth 
discussion and many examples of how the above 
threats impact knowledge systems.  However, in 2020-
21, because of COVID-19, natural disasters, social 
upheaval, misinformation, etc. generated more 
uncertainty and stress overall in organizations and 
individuals than had been previously experienced since 
perhaps the great depression. 
The uncertainty associated with knowledge use, be 
it due to rapidly changing technology and storage 
media, to misuse or new and unexpected uses of 
knowledge, or the basic understanding of the captured 
knowledge, is one of the biggest challenges a 
knowledge system manager faces. To understand the 
impact of this uncertainty and stress, events, and 
outcomes from 2020 and 2021 have been analyzed in 
the following section using the above knowledge 
system threats and the previously discussed process.  
In addition to identifying the important knowledge 
of an organization, risk assessment requires the 
understanding of where the threats can enter the 
organization and target the knowledge system. We use 
three threat vectors in this paper: technical, behavioral, 
and legal [16]. 
 
3. Analysis of events and observations of 
2020-21 
Obasiolu [24] found the biggest lesson from 2020-
21 to be that security starts from within an 
organization, meaning that security starts with top 
management creating a security culture and 
expectations of behavior. While we agree with this 
observation, we are providing additional and more 
concrete observations:  
Misinformation/disinformation leads to bad 
individual decision-making on which links to click or 
which email to open (KnowBe4 says 88% of data 
breaches are caused by human error due to phishing 
and other errors). The largest Twitter and Facebook 
hacks in 2020 was caused by Twitter and Facebook 
employees falling for a phishing attack [10] [35]. 
• Misinformation/disinformation impacts procedural 
decision-making on hiring, purchasing, and 
customer service. This can lead to security issues 
such as internal threats, transferring funds to the 
wrong bank, and offending customers [20]. 
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• Hundred-year storms (Texas recently, southeast 
over the late summer, California wildfires) 
challenge disaster recovery plans and potentially 
lose knowledge and influence the availability of 
systems [2] [11] [33]. 
• A pandemic causes larger than expected personnel 
turnover and knowledge loss degrading 
organizational performance 
• Organizational culture changes lower trust among 
workers resulting in less knowledge sharing and 
most importantly, less sharing of knowledge 
critical to decision making affecting security (bad 
sites, hacking attempts, social engineering, etc.) 
• Organizational members upset at culture changes 
deliberately do not share knowledge or share 
disinformation leading to bad decision making 
• Social isolation slows the sharing, capturing, and 
reuse of knowledge needed for security decisions  
• Social isolation increases the use of social media 
leading to more potential disclosures, more 
opportunities for downloading malware onto 
worker computers used for home and work, lower 
filters to determining misinformation/ 
disinformation [35]. 
• Generation Z is most impacted by the above issues 
[29]. 
These observations are analyzed in this section using 
five of the previously listed knowledge system threats 
and the above-mentioned threat vectors. The threat of 
not having knowledge creation, capture, and use 
aligned with organizational strategy is only mildly 
impacted so is not addressed. 
 
3.1 Failure to identify/capture critical 
knowledge in the knowledge creation 
process in 2020-21 
With most workers working remotely, decision-
making was automatically pushed down to them. Being 
remote made it difficult for workers to stay current in 
the knowledge needed to support decision-making. 
Also, remote work creates isolation from work 
networks which in turn slows the spread of knowledge 
and enables the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation. Remote work makes workers more 
susceptible to not being able to identify misinformation 
and disinformation and making wrong decisions as to 
what is critical knowledge. A focus on COVID-19 may 
lead organizations and workers to not keeping 
automated tools up to date and collecting critical 
knowledge.  Finally, the rapid spread and use of new 
collaboration tools such as Zoom and Teams [17] 
could have led organizations to not integrate these new 
tools into automated knowledge capture tools so new 
knowledge generated and spread by these new 
collaboration tools may not be captured. 
Technical threats are from the quick adoption of 
new collaboration technologies such as Zoom and 
Teams [17] with subsequent slow integration into 
organizational systems and potential for automated 
tools not working with the new technology.  
Behavioral threats are from widespread remote 
work and worker isolation and a flood of 
misinformation/disinformation pushed to socially 
isolated workers [20]. This increases the likelihood of 
missing critical knowledge and identifying 
misinformation and disinformation as critical 
knowledge. 
Legal threats are stemming from new privacy 
laws (e.g., California) as well as a myriad of new social 
justice, health, and diversity/inclusion mandates greatly 
increasing the risk of missing a legal requirement for 
capturing critical knowledge, not protecting critical 
knowledge, or identifying incorrect critical knowledge. 
3.2 Disclosing critical knowledge to 
unauthorized recipients in the knowledge 
sharing processes in 2020-21 
With widespread remote work, social isolation, 
and greatly reduced supervision humans replace 
normal socialization with online socialization [21]. 
With reduced supervision, malicious/hacktivist 
employees were more likely to disclose or commit 
fraud [20] greatly increasing the likelihood that critical 
knowledge will be disclosed.  Social isolation makes 
humans more vulnerable to social engineering. New 
group/collaboration software increases the reach of 
social engineers including nation-state social 
engineers.  Many instances of over disclosure were 
revealed this last year in Zoom and Twitter attacks. 
Technical threats are stemming from the 
exploitation of communication vulnerabilities common 
to all communication systems and are focused on 
communication processes specific to knowledge 
systems.  Additional threats are from storage media 
that does not properly secure access to cloud storage 
and/or server storage.  2020 increased these threat 
likelihoods because organizations quickly adopted 
collaboration software while not having the onsite staff 
to supervise and monitor installations and updates. 
Examples of these threats include Zoombombing [8] 
and large-scale hacks at Twitter.   
Behavioral threats are come from intentionally or 
accidentally failing to maintain access control lists for 
authorizing approved personnel to access knowledge, 
posting knowledge to inappropriate forums, not 
following disclosure processes, not encrypting 
knowledge in motion, falling victim to social 
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engineering attacks, and either disclosing knowledge to 
unauthorized individuals or allowing malware onto 
their systems that are collecting and transmitting 
knowledge to unauthorized individuals [6]. 2020 saw 
this threat likelihood greatly rise by increasing the 
attack surface through social isolation and widespread 
remote workers [20] [35] [36].  Additionally, workers 
were not able to create quality relationships with new 
organizational members as they could only meet 
remotely [20]. Examples of behavioral threats include 
social engineering attacks on Twitter [8] [35] that had 
workers responding to disinformation. 
Legal threats come from intentionally or 
accidentally not complying with disclosure laws such 
as those dealing with personally identifiable 
information or patient health knowledge.  2020 saw 
new privacy laws in California as well as a myriad of 
new social justice, health, and diversity/inclusion 
mandates greatly increasing the risk of missing a legal 
requirement. 
 
3.3 Losing critical knowledge by not capturing 
it from critical human sources in 2020-21 
The pandemic has forced societies to shutdowns 
and many organizations have severely reduced or even 
ceased operations or changed their operations to purely 
online environments.  As organizations strive for 
survival, they have been forced to lay off a lot of 
employees rapidly, discard a lot of old technology and 
rapidly adopt new technological tools. In addition to 
layoffs, there have been extended absences due to 
long-term illness and unanticipated deaths of 
employees. All of these have resulted in losing critical 
knowledge.  
Technical threats are linked to not being able to 
utilize established tools and processes for capturing 
knowledge from departing personnel.  2020-21 saw 
rapid shutdowns and employee loss that precluded 
organizations and companies from using their 
knowledge capture tools and processes to capture 
knowledge from laid-off employees.  Additionally, 
COVID-19 caused large numbers of deaths where most 
of these deaths occurred in isolated wards that also 
precluded any possibility of capturing knowledge 
before the employee’s death.  
Another threat is from ransomware encrypting 
critical knowledge repositories and the organization or 
company not being able to recover them through 
backups or by paying the ransom.  Some major 
examples include JB Swift paying approximately $11 
million [3] and the Colonial Pipeline approximately $5 
million to retrieve their data [28] while the University 
of California, San Diego paid $1 million ransom to 
ensure their COVID-19 research data was not 
destroyed [42].  2020-21 increased the likelihood of the 
above threats especially due to the quick adoption of 
new technologies and procedures while eliminating 
older technologies and procedures. 
A final threat comes from wildfires, polar blasts, 
hurricanes, and flooding all of which challenged 
disaster recovery/business continuity plans as remote 
workers couldn’t or had difficulty accessing backup 
and recovery systems to support implementing the 
recovery and thus returning captured critical 
knowledge to organizational/company use. 
Behavioral threats come from intentionally or 
accidentally not identifying critical human knowledge 
repositories and taking actions to capture and store the 
critical knowledge (e.g., not capturing knowledge from 
retiring personnel but also can occur by not capturing 
knowledge from personnel departing an organization 
for reasons other than retirement). 2020 saw increased 
employee stress as organizations changed how they 
were operating. As new systems/processes were 
implemented, the likelihood of knowledge loss 
increased. Knowledge was lost as employees were 
suddenly let go, got sick, or even died.  Social isolation 
and loss of trust in the organization have reduced 
knowledge sharing and knowledge capture.  
Misinformation/disinformation has created confusion 
as to what was the knowledge needing to be captured. 
Legal threats originated from intentionally or 
accidentally not complying with required knowledge 
capture (an example of this was Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission requirements on nuclear stations to 
capture critical knowledge from employees before 
large-scale workforce layoffs). 2020 has lowered the 
focus on capturing knowledge from departing 
employees as organizations struggle just to survive, 
and this is likely to become an issue in the long term, 
even if it has not been an issue in the short term. 
3.4 Losing critical knowledge by not storing it 
on nonvolatile media/not migrating 
knowledge with changing storage 
standards/not meeting legal standards for 
storing critical knowledge in 2020-21 
While COVID-19 did not directly impact this 
outcome, not having personnel in the office means 
migration of data to newer technologies was slow or 
non-existent.  Natural disasters were wreaking havoc, 
though, like California and Australian wildfires, Texas 
polar blast, and hurricanes, and flooding in the 
southeast United States have impacted power and 
communication grids which in turn impacted secure 
storage facilities [11] [38]. 
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Technical threats are rooted in the failure of 
storage media, hardware, and/or software.  Additional 
threats are from technical obsolescence leading to the 
loss of knowledge as the organization migrates to 
newer technologies or from the failure of obsolete 
devices.  Other threats come from the loss of repository 
devices and not having an appropriate backup process 
in place or an installed tracking system.  A final threat 
is from ransomware encrypting critical knowledge 
repositories and not being able to recover them through 
backups or by not paying the ransom.  2020-21 saw 
many successful ransomware attacks that resulted in 
large payouts (see section 4.3 for examples). 
Additionally, events that cause widespread damage or 
extended loss of power can cause storage devices to 
fail or be destroyed.  2020-21 saw a 100 + year winter 
storm that caused the grid to fail in the state of Texas 
[33], wildfires in California [2] and Australia [11] that 
destroyed miles of transmission lines and equipment, 
and record hurricanes and storms in the southeast 
United States [11] that also destroyed miles of 
transmission lines and equipment. The technical threats 
come from failed equipment and backups and security 
teams need to review their disaster recovery/business 
continuity plans to ensure the secure storage being 
counted on is truly secure from a power and 
communication point.  Note that Y2K had many of the 
same issues and it was important that the work on Y2K 
was done as it was much worse than the public knew. 
Behavioral threats are from intentionally or 
accidentally not following technology procurement 
processes, selecting providers without checking their 
technology, not planning for obsolescence, not testing 
technologies before applying them or while using 
them, and/or artificially obsoleting technologies before 
age requires it.  2020-21 saw great disruptions in 
supply chains and in purchasing decisions so this threat 
likelihood was greatly increased. Additionally, remote 
workers were more likely to not follow backup 
processes due to lack of system access or not being 
able to while following new processes. 
Legal threats are from liability issues associated 
with not following sanctioned or committed storage 
standards (such as those standards from NIST and 
ISO).  2020-21 saw remote work with many office 
locations not staffed, this increases the likelihood of 
this occurring as IS/IT staff can’t migrate to new 
storage standards or make changes to existing storage 
standards. 
3.5 Giving bad advice by not using appropriate 
knowledge or by using inappropriate 
knowledge in 2020-21 
This is perhaps the most likely threat given the 
proliferation of misinformation and disinformation.  
The response to COVID-19 is replete with this 
happening with perhaps the most egregious example 
being that of deciding to send COVID-19 patients to 
nursing homes so that they could get better care but, in 
the process, infecting the most vulnerable.  The most 
recent example is on those deciding not to get the 
vaccine.  The main issue was the proliferation of 
misinformation and disinformation in virtually every 
aspect of the 2020-21 issues.  There is misinformation 
and disinformation in COVID-19, the 2020 elections, 
the social justice movement, and virtually every other 
issue.  In addition to misinformation and 
disinformation, there are new processes for identifying 
and censoring misinformation and disinformation. 
Finally, remote workers have access to all this 
misinformation and disinformation but do not have 
support in determining what is true and what is false as 
the media in the United States has become politicized 
and partisan and while the social media firms are 
making attempts to censor misinformation and 
disinformation, creating their censor rules on the fly.  
Technical threats are from search tools not 
finding relevant knowledge, improperly prioritizing 
some knowledge, not using integration tools allowing 
relevant knowledge to not be incorporated into search 
results, and/or using visualization technologies that 
influence decision-makers to the wrong option.  2020-
21 saw the rise of the use of AI tools to filter out 
misinformation and disinformation.  However, the 
problem with AI tools is that they reflect the bias of 
their builders, and this was obvious with the tools used 
by Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google, etc.  
Additional threats come from the classification of 
knowledge in knowledge systems and this effort being 
slowed by workers working remotely and not having 
access to all the knowledge gathered or the time to 
solicit and classify knowledge from other remote 
workers.  A final threat comes from knowledge 
systems not having adequate processes for validating 
the accuracy of knowledge in the system. 
Behavioral threats are from decision-makers 
using incomplete knowledge, and/or inappropriately 
applying knowledge to unsuitable decision contexts.  
2020-21 saw this likelihood greatly increased as social 
isolation, social media use, and lack of interactions 
with organizational experts increased while reliance on 
media fact-checkers led to an increased likelihood of 
using weak/bad knowledge for making decisions.  
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Legal threats are from decision-makers not 
utilizing due care or due diligence in assessing 
knowledge and focusing on politically correct or 
desired advice.  Another threat is from not giving 
advice or giving advice based on limiting liability 
rather than stating the advice suggested by the 
knowledge system. 2020-21 saw a great increase in 
social unrest leading to whole new standards and laws 
on social justice and revised history greatly increasing 
the likelihood of this threat. While not quite a legal 
issue (it is vigilante justice), society has taken to 
“canceling” individuals and organizations that don’t 
support new norms.  Knowledge systems have the risk 
of not changing content fast enough to avoid not 
meeting new norms, which has resulted in canceling of 
organizations and companies. 
4. Discussion 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze risk to 
knowledge in the light of the recent COVID-19 
pandemic. Obasiolu [24] reports that companies did 
not know themselves well enough to implement a 
security program resilient enough to handle the many 
severe challenges faced in 2020-21.  An organization 
cannot properly secure its knowledge assets if it 
doesn’t understand its main business processes and 
validation of these processes that create knowledge. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) [25] reports that cybersecurity 
risks greatly increased in crises because stressed 
organizations and companies are more vulnerable to 
attacks.  This paper agrees with this assessment and 
describes further threats for knowledge systems and 
knowledge system risk assessment under extreme 
circumstances as created by COVID-19 and other 
natural disasters during 2020 and 2021. We identified 
five specific cases of knowledge risk and described 
them in terms of technical, behavioral, and legal 
threats.  
There are several critical issues that every 
organization must address. First is the issue of 
knowledge identification, more specifically identifying 
misinformation and disinformation. Organizations can 
address this threat by training employees in how to 
identify misinformation/disinformation [38], or by 
creating a position that would be responsible for 
monitoring and identifying misinformation/ 
disinformation [18]. The usage of AI tools for filtering 
news, emails, for identifying deep fakes, frauds, 
misinformation/disinformation will be critical for an 
organization to be able to make good business 
decisions using validated knowledge sources. Finally, 
organizations need to find a way to inform their 
employees about misinformation/disinformation, 
frauds, and deep fakes, while not overburdening them 
with additional information. 
The second is forming or rewriting guidelines and 
instructions for employee online behavior. 
Organizations need to focus on the social media usage 
of their employees for both knowledge sharing and 
knowledge reuse. The dilemma that organizations are 
facing is how to create rules that create acceptable 
social media usage without denying freedom of speech. 
Future research should evaluate the limit of what is 
acceptable and unacceptable to talk about on social 
media when it comes to organizations and their lives. 
There is a need to define the protocols of responding to 
questions in social media; for example, when an 
employee responds, should his/her view be treated as 
the views of the organization or personal views? 
Guidelines about social media engagement during and 
after work hours are needed specifically for the remote 
workforce because of the blurry line between work and 
private life. The guidelines for social media 
engagement should also include a section on how to 
spot and evaluate potential misinformation and 
disinformation, as well as the threat of downloading 
malware.  
The third is the identification and evaluation of 
communication channels. The social isolation of 
employees creates a unique problem. We have learned 
that employees miss socializing with their coworkers 
and that virtual social hours do not work as a 
replacement for physical socializing. Especially 
Generation Z is very sensitive to social isolation and 
organizations need to create special networking 
programs for these employees. Promoting socializing 
channels that help people to get together and know 
each other helps the organization to reduce the risk of 
employees falling prey to social engineering attacks. 
Correct channels for work-related socializing also 
reduce the risk of knowledge spillovers, as well as 
helps promote job satisfaction among the employees, 
and thus reduce unwanted employee turnover. 
Finally, a major risk re-assessment is needed in 
most organizations. Extreme disasters (wildfires, riots, 
floods, hurricanes, polar blasts, etc.) cause major 
disruption in the operations of a business. 
Organizations need to come up with strategies to 
secure knowledge when a natural disaster hits and 
when it may destroy knowledge sources or access to 
these knowledge sources might not be available.  
Re-evaluation of disaster response/business continuity 
plans is needed given that the likelihood of extreme 
events is much higher than most organizations 
anticipated even a year ago.  Knowledge systems that 
allow employees to share and retrieve knowledge must 
be not only defended against natural threats but also be 
easily accessible while working remotely.  
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5. Conclusions  
2020-21 may be outlier years but it has shown us 
that the likelihood of extreme events is greater than we 
like to admit.  We must acknowledge that 
organizations are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks 
when stressed [25], and other knowledge risks are also 
compounded when the environment of the organization 
is in turmoil. 
Parakilas [27] suggests expanding the definition of 
the cyber threat to include more than just traditional 
and terrorist attacks.  This paper expands the threats to 
knowledge systems to include the wide variety of 
issues discussed in the paper.  However, these threats 
are outside the technical expertise of the traditional 
cybersecurity department. Taking a wider perspective 
to the risks to the knowledge systems and their use in 
the organization, seemingly small technical risks may 
turn out to be big risks to smooth daily operation and 
knowledge transfer. Cybersecurity organizations need 
to be agile [25] interdisciplinary in composition and 
include experts in knowledge capture, transfer, and use 
as well as in decision making. 
Expertise in identifying and countering 
misinformation/disinformation is also needed in the 
cybersecurity organization [38]. Identifying important 
knowledge in the organization is not an easy feat, as 
this requires the understanding of knowledge transfer 
and retrieval processes of employees, and their 
practices of evaluating the knowledge they have access 
to. It thus is not enough for the organization that the 
cybersecurity experts are able to identify 
misinformation on sight. They need to know how 
misinformation and disinformation reach the 
employees and help the employees to spot them as 
well. This cannot be only the task of security 
professionals, rather, the involvement of the whole of 
the organization is needed. 
Finally, organizations and companies need 
expertise in organizational psychology to assist the 
organization in preparing employees to understand, 
identify, and deflect/reject misinformation, 
disinformation, and phishing [36] and to aid in 
identifying the insider threat. Another value from 
having organization psychology expertise is in 
assisting employees in dealing with anxiety related to 
remote work and social justice issues. The bottom line 
is that the human element must be addressed first in 
cybersecurity [35]. 
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